The ocean is big. Really big. When you’re staring at the horizon from the deck of a Mark VI patrol boat, you realize just how vulnerable a 85-foot aluminum hull can feel in the middle of a choppy sea. It’s a beast of a machine, sure. It’s got enough firepower to make a pirate think twice about his life choices, but in the grand scheme of modern naval warfare, this boat is currently stuck in a weird kind of limbo.
People love to talk about the massive supercarriers or the stealthy submarines that cost billions. But it’s the smaller stuff, the "brown water" and "green water" assets, that actually do the dirty work of coastal security. The Mark VI was supposed to be the future of that work.
Built by SAFE Boats International, these things were touted as the ultimate answer to littoral combat. They’re fast. They can hit speeds over 35 knots without breaking a sweat. If you’ve ever seen one skipping across the waves, it looks less like a ship and more like a high-performance sports car with a couple of Mk 38 Mod 2 25mm gun systems bolted to the top. But here’s the kicker: despite being relatively new, the U.S. Navy has been trying to mothball them for years.
Why? It’s not because they’re bad boats. It’s because the world changed faster than the procurement cycle could handle.
What Makes a Mark VI Patrol Boat Actually Tick?
Technically speaking, the Mark VI isn't just a bigger version of the old Riverine Command Boats. It’s a clean-sheet design meant to survive in "contested environments."
Let’s talk power. It runs on twin MTU 16V2000 M94 diesel engines. These aren't your grandpa's truck engines; they’re paired with HamiltonJet HM651 waterjets. Because it uses waterjets instead of traditional propellers, the boat can operate in remarkably shallow water. It can slide into coves and up rivers where a destroyer would basically just become a very expensive beach ornament.
Inside, it’s surprisingly tech-heavy. The bridge looks more like a NASA control room than a traditional cockpit. There are shock-mitigating seats for the crew because, honestly, hitting a five-foot wave at 40 mph feels like being punched in the spine by a giant. If you aren't strapped in, you're going to have a very bad day.
The payload is the real story, though. It’s modular. You can swap out gear depending on the mission. Need to launch some drones? There’s space for that. Need to carry a squad of Navy SEALs and their rubber raiding craft? The back deck is literally designed for it. It has a launch and recovery system for small boats (UUVs and UAVs) that makes it a "mother ship" for autonomous tech.
The Firepower Problem
Usually, when people see the Mark VI patrol boat, they notice the guns first. You've got the 25mm chain guns, which are remotely operated. The gunner stays inside the armored cabin, looking at a screen and using a joystick. It’s very "video game," until the rounds start hitting the target.
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But here is where the controversy starts.
Critics—and plenty of folks in the Pentagon—argue that while a 25mm gun is great for stopping a small skiff or a fast-attack craft, it’s basically a peashooter against a modern Chinese or Russian frigate. The Navy is shifting its focus toward "Great Power Competition." In that world, you aren't worried about smugglers in the Persian Gulf; you're worried about long-range anti-ship missiles in the South China Sea.
The Mark VI lacks a meaningful "long-range" punch. It doesn't carry Harpoons or Tomahawks. It’s a knife-fighter in a world where everyone else is bringing sniper rifles to the party.
Ukraine and the International Second Life
While the U.S. Navy has been lukewarm on the platform lately, other countries are obsessed with it.
Look at Ukraine. In the ongoing conflict with Russia, the Black Sea has become a nightmare for large ships. Big targets get sunk by drones and shore-based missiles. But a Mark VI patrol boat? It’s small. It’s fast. It’s hard to hit.
The U.S. Department of State approved the sale of up to 16 Mark VI boats to Ukraine back in 2020. Since then, they've become a central part of the conversation about how smaller navies can punch above their weight class. For a country like Ukraine, these boats aren't just "coastal patrol." They are vital defense assets that can harass larger fleets and keep shipping lanes open.
It’s a weird paradox. The U.S. Navy thinks the boat is too small for the big fight, while smaller navies think it’s the perfect size for their biggest fight.
Living on the Edge: The Crew Experience
You can't talk about these boats without mentioning the people who live on them. A standard crew is about 10 people, though it can carry up to 18.
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Life on a Mark VI is cramped. It’s not a cruiser. You don't have a galley with a chef. You have a microwave and some bunks. It’s designed for missions that last a few days, not a few months. But because they are so fast and agile, the crews tend to be incredibly tight-knit.
There's a specific kind of pride in being a "small boat sailor." You’re closer to the water. You feel every vibration of the engines. When you’re operating in the Persian Gulf or the Philippine Sea, you are the front line. You’re the one who has to pull up alongside a suspicious vessel and figure out if they’re fishing or prepping an IED.
Why the Navy Tried to Kill It (And Why It’s Still Here)
In 2021, the Navy basically said, "We're done." They proposed cutting the entire fleet of 12 boats to save money—roughly $74 million a year in operating costs.
The logic was purely mathematical. To make the Mark VI survive in a high-end fight against a "near-peer" adversary (read: China), the Navy would have to spend a fortune upgrading them with better sensors and actual missiles. If you do that, the boat gets heavier, slower, and way more expensive. At that point, the brass wondered if it was better to just spend that money on more unmanned vessels or larger frigates.
However, Congress didn't exactly agree. There’s been a lot of back-and-forth. Proponents argue that getting rid of the Mark VI patrol boat leaves a massive gap in our ability to protect harbors and conduct "visit, board, search, and seizure" (VBSS) missions.
You can’t use a billion-dollar destroyer to chase a $50,000 cigarette boat. It’s overkill and a waste of resources.
The Tech Reality Check
Let’s be honest about the limitations.
The Mark VI is made of aluminum. That’s great for speed, but aluminum doesn't like fire. And it definitely doesn't like missiles. If a Mark VI gets hit by anything significant, it’s probably going down.
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Furthermore, the maintenance is surprisingly high for a "small" boat. Those high-performance diesels and waterjets require constant attention. In a salty, humid environment, things break. If you don't have a solid logistics chain behind you, these boats become very expensive pierside decorations very quickly.
Comparing the Mark VI to the Old School
If you look back at the PT boats of World War II, you see the spiritual ancestor of the Mark VI. The PT boats were also plywood and mahogany speedsters designed to torpedo much larger ships.
The difference is that the Mark VI was never really intended to be a "ship killer" in its base configuration. It was designed for the Global War on Terror era—low-intensity conflict, counter-piracy, and infrastructure protection.
The shift to "distributed lethality" (the idea of spreading weapons across many small platforms instead of a few big ones) should have made the Mark VI more relevant. But the Navy seems to prefer the idea of unmanned small boats for that role. Why risk 10 sailors when you can send a robot boat with a missile rack?
Future Prospects: A Coastal Workhorse?
So, where does that leave us?
The Mark VI patrol boat is currently in a "wait and see" mode. Some are being transferred to different commands. Others are being used for testing new weapons systems.
There is a real possibility that the Mark VI becomes the primary testbed for "loitering munitions"—essentially suicide drones. If you can pack a dozen Switchblade drones onto the back of a Mark VI, you suddenly have a boat that can sink a much larger vessel from 25 miles away. That changes the math.
Suddenly, that "peashooter" problem goes away.
Practical Takeaways for the Defense-Minded
If you’re following the development of naval tech, there are a few things you should keep an eye on regarding these boats:
- Export Success: Watch how Ukraine and other nations utilize the Mark VI. Their success (or failure) in actual combat will dictate whether SAFE Boats International gets more orders from places like the Philippines or Vietnam.
- Modular Upgrades: Keep an eye on whether the Navy actually pulls the trigger on integrating "long-range precision fires" (missiles) onto the existing hulls. This is the only way the boat survives the next decade of budget cuts.
- The Unmanned Transition: The Mark VI is increasingly being used as a "control node" for smaller underwater drones. This might be its true calling—not as a fighter, but as a mobile command center for a swarm of robots.
The Mark VI is a masterpiece of engineering that arrived just as the mission it was built for started to disappear. It's too big to be a "small boat" and too small to be a "ship." But in the messy, gray-zone world of modern maritime security, its speed and versatility keep it in the fight—at least for now.
Next Steps for Deeper Insight
- Research the HamiltonJet HM651 propulsion system: Understanding the physics of waterjet propulsion explains why these boats can pull off maneuvers that seem impossible for their size.
- Look into the "Ghost Fleet Overlord" program: This is where the Navy is headed with unmanned versions of small patrol craft, which provides the necessary context for why the manned Mark VI is under fire.
- Track the 12 existing hulls: Follow the specific deployments of the Navy's current Mark VI fleet to see if they are being concentrated in the Indo-Pacific or kept for domestic harbor defense.