Richard Preston wrote a book that kept a lot of people awake in the early 2000s. It wasn't a horror novel, though it felt like one. It was a true account of biological weapons, the anthrax attacks, and the most terrifying resident of any laboratory on Earth: variola major. You probably know it as smallpox. While the disease was officially eradicated from the wild in 1980, the "demon in the freezer" refers to the lingering samples kept under lock and key in two high-security locations—one in the United States and one in Russia.
It's a weird situation. We killed the virus, but we didn't destroy it. Why?
If you talk to someone like Dr. D.A. Henderson—the man who basically led the global charge to wipe smallpox off the face of the map—you'd get a very specific perspective on the risk. Henderson was a giant in public health. He saw the devastation of smallpox firsthand. He watched it scar children and blind people. When he talked about the demon in the freezer, he wasn't being metaphorical. He was talking about a biological entity that had killed more humans than all the wars in history combined.
Smallpox is relentless. It spreads through the air. It causes a high fever, followed by a rash that turns into painful, pus-filled pustules. About 30% of the people who catch it die. Those who survive often carry deep, pitted scars for the rest of their lives. It's not a gentle way to go.
The Cold War Legacy of Smallpox Research
The history of the demon in the freezer is deeply tied to the Cold War. During the 20th century, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union didn't just study smallpox for vaccines; they studied how to use it as a weapon. This is the part that usually makes people's skin crawl. Ken Alibek, a former high-ranking official in the Soviet Union’s secret biological weapons program (Biopreparat), defected to the U.S. and revealed some staggering details. He claimed the Soviets had figured out how to mass-produce smallpox and even load it into intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Think about that for a second. Missiles filled with smallpox.
🔗 Read more: Exercises to Get Big Boobs: What Actually Works and the Anatomy Most People Ignore
When Preston’s book The Demon in the Freezer hit the shelves, it wasn't just rehashing old history. It was connecting the dots between those Cold War stockpiles and the 2001 anthrax attacks. The world felt vulnerable. Suddenly, the idea of a "controlled" sample in a freezer didn't feel so controlled. People began asking: what if someone stole it? What if there's a secret stash somewhere that the World Health Organization (WHO) doesn't know about?
Today, the official samples live in two places. One is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia. The other is the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) in Koltsovo, Russia. They are stored in liquid nitrogen at temperatures so low that the virus is essentially suspended in time. It's waiting.
Why Don't We Just Burn It All?
This is the billion-dollar question. Every few years, the WHO meets to discuss whether or not to destroy the remaining stocks of variola major. Every few years, they decide to wait. It’s a classic "devil you know" scenario.
Scientists argue that we need the live virus to develop better antivirals and safer vaccines. If a "rogue" strain ever appeared—perhaps from a forgotten lab or a synthetic biology experiment—we would be sitting ducks without the original blueprint to test against. On the flip side, many experts argue that keeping the virus is the very thing that creates the risk. As long as it exists, it can be leaked, stolen, or used as a template for genetic engineering.
Honestly, the technology has changed the game. In 2017, a team of researchers in Canada led by David Evans managed to synthesize horsepox—a relative of smallpox—from scratch using mail-order DNA. They spent about $100,000. It proved that you don't necessarily need the demon in the freezer to recreate a demon. You just need the genetic code and a decent lab. This makes the argument for keeping the official stocks even more complicated. If the "blueprint" is already online, does destroying the physical vials even matter?
💡 You might also like: Products With Red 40: What Most People Get Wrong
The 2001 Anthrax Scare and the Smallpox Connection
Preston’s narrative spends a lot of time on Peter Jahrling, a scientist at USAMRIID (U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax letters, the fear was that smallpox was next. Jahrling was trying to understand if smallpox could be made even more deadly.
There was a specific experiment involving Ectromelia (mousepox). Researchers in Australia had accidentally found that by inserting a specific gene into mousepox, they could create a version that bypassed the immune systems of vaccinated mice. This sent shockwaves through the biosecurity community. If someone did that to human smallpox, the current vaccines might be useless.
This is the nightmare scenario. A modified demon.
The debate over the demon in the freezer isn't just about history. It’s about the future of synthetic biology. We are living in an era where we can "print" life. CRISPR and other gene-editing tools are becoming cheaper and more accessible. While this is great for curing cancer, it's terrifying when you apply it to ancient plagues.
Realities of Modern Biosecurity
If you visit the CDC’s high-containment labs, you aren't just walking into a room with a fridge. It’s a fortress. Multiple layers of security. Biometric scans. Air pressure gradients that ensure air only flows into the lab, never out. Scientists wear positive-pressure suits that look like spacesuits. If a suit gets a tear, the air inside pushes out, preventing the virus from getting in.
📖 Related: Why Sometimes You Just Need a Hug: The Real Science of Physical Touch
But even with all that, humans make mistakes. In 2014, workers at a National Institutes of Health (NIH) facility in Maryland found six vials of smallpox from the 1950s just sitting in a cardboard box in a storage room. They had been forgotten for decades. Luckily, they were sealed and no one was infected, but it proved the point: the demon can be anywhere.
Russia’s VECTOR lab has had its own scares. In 2019, a gas explosion caused a fire at the facility. The Russian government stated that the area where the viruses are stored wasn't affected, but it certainly reminded the world that even the most secure facilities are subject to the laws of physics and human error.
Actionable Insights for the Modern World
Smallpox is gone from our daily lives, but the lessons of the demon in the freezer are more relevant than ever. Understanding this history helps us navigate current biosecurity challenges, especially in the wake of recent global pandemics.
- Vaccination Status: Most people born after 1972 (in the U.S.) or 1980 (globally) have not been vaccinated against smallpox. This means the vast majority of the world's population is "immunologically naive" to the virus.
- The "Monkeypox" (Mpox) Connection: You likely saw the 2022-2023 Mpox outbreaks in the news. Mpox is an orthopoxvirus, a cousin to smallpox. The reason it wasn't a total catastrophe is that we already had vaccines (like Jynneos) and treatments (like TPOXX) developed specifically because scientists were worried about the "demon in the freezer."
- Support Biosecurity Legislation: Transparency in high-containment labs is vital. Public awareness of how these pathogens are handled helps ensure that safety protocols are strictly followed and funded.
- Digital Biosecurity: The next frontier isn't just physical vials; it's the DNA sequences stored on computers. Protecting genomic data from "dual-use" research (research that can be used for both good and harm) is a major focus for modern biodefense.
The demon in the freezer remains one of the most polarizing topics in science. It’s a standoff between the need for research and the risk of catastrophe. For now, the freezers stay cold, the guards stay armed, and the world keeps a nervous eye on Atlanta and Koltsovo. The virus is dead, but as long as those samples exist, it isn't truly gone. It’s just sleeping.
To stay informed on this topic, follow the official WHO Smallpox Secretariat reports which are released periodically. They provide the most accurate updates on whether the destruction of the remaining stocks will finally happen or be delayed again. Awareness of the history of the eradication program remains the best defense against the return of such a devastating disease, whether by accident or intent. Keep an eye on advancements in broad-spectrum antivirals, as these are the real-world shields against the pox family as a whole.