Stephen Spoonamore Duty to Warn Letter: What Most People Get Wrong

Stephen Spoonamore Duty to Warn Letter: What Most People Get Wrong

You’ve probably seen the name Stephen Spoonamore popping up in corners of the internet dedicated to election integrity. He isn't some random guy with a laptop; he's a cybersecurity expert who has spent decades looking at how systems fail. When he talks about a "duty to warn," people usually start paying attention, or at least they should.

The Stephen Spoonamore duty to warn letter isn't just a single document; it’s part of a long-standing crusade by a man who insists that our electronic voting systems are fundamentally broken. Honestly, it’s a bit terrifying when you dig into the specifics. Spoonamore has worked with big names—MasterCard, the Navy, Bloomberg—so when he says a system is "riddled with exploitable errors," it’s hard to just shrug it off as a conspiracy theory.

The Core of the Warning: Why Spoonamore is Sounding the Alarm

Basically, the "duty to warn" refers to a moral and professional obligation Spoonamore feels to alert election officials about what he calls "Man-in-the-Middle" (MIM) attacks. He’s been talking about this since the 2004 election in Ohio.

The theory is pretty straightforward but technically complex. Imagine a "KingPin" computer sitting between a county tabulator and the Secretary of State’s central system. As the data flows through, this middle-man computer intercepts the vote totals, flips a few percentages from Candidate A to Candidate B, and then passes the "clean" but fraudulent data along. To the officials watching the screen, everything looks normal.

Spoonamore’s declarations, particularly those filed in cases like King Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association v. Blackwell, outline how easy it is to inject these changes. He argues that if you can't verify the identity of every user on a system—which you can't in an anonymous voting environment—you can't have a secure electronic system. Period.

Breaking Down the Technical Fears

  • The Tabulator Trap: He’s famously pointed out that voting machines are just custom-built computers. They should start at zero and go up by one. But many systems have been found to allow negative numbers. Why would a voting machine ever need a negative number? There's no legitimate reason.
  • The "Connally Anomaly": This refers to specific, statistically "impossible" shifts in vote ratios that Spoonamore observed on election nights. He argues these aren't natural swings but the result of a script running on a server to "tune" the results.
  • The Destruction of Evidence: A major part of his warning involves the physical security of the machines. In his 2009 declarations, he noted that hard drives were reportedly removed or wiped before recounts could happen, making forensic analysis impossible.

What the Letter Actually Says to Election Officials

While the term "duty to warn letter" is often used to describe his formal legal declarations, in recent cycles, it has also referred to direct outreach to Secretaries of State. The message is usually some variation of: "Your current architecture is vulnerable, and I am formally putting you on notice."

He isn't just saying "it could happen." He's saying it is happening because the architecture allows it. He points to things like the "SmartTech" IT routing switch used in previous Ohio elections as a smoking gun for how a "Man-in-the-Middle" setup is actually built into the network.

Critics often say Spoonamore is too alarmist. They point out that there has been no judicial finding of the massive, system-wide fraud he describes. But Spoonamore’s response is usually that the people in charge don't want to find it because it would invalidate the entire process. It's a bit of a stalemate.

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Why This Matters in 2026

We are living in an era where trust in elections is at an all-time low. Whether you think Spoonamore is a hero or a herald of doom, his technical critiques of electronic voting remain largely unaddressed by the proprietary software companies that run our elections.

The Stephen Spoonamore duty to warn letter serves as a persistent reminder that "black box" voting—where we can't see the code or verify the transmission—is a massive security risk. He pushes for paper ballots, hand counts, and transparent chain of custody. Sorta old school, right? But in a world where AI can now mimic human behavior and hackers are getting more sophisticated every day, "old school" might be the only way to be sure.

Misconceptions and Nuance

A lot of people think Spoonamore is a partisan actor. He’s not. He’s been critical of systems that favored both major parties at different times. His focus is on the math and the architecture.

It’s also important to understand that he isn't claiming every election is stolen. He’s claiming that the infrastructure is built in a way that allows them to be stolen without detection. That distinction is key. It’s the difference between saying your front door is unlocked and saying someone has already walked through it. Both are problems, but one is a structural vulnerability that needs fixing immediately.


Actionable Steps for the Informed Citizen

If you're concerned about the issues raised in the Stephen Spoonamore duty to warn letter, don't just sit there and worry. There are actual things you can do to check the health of your local election system:

  1. Demand Paper Ballots: Check if your precinct uses BMDs (Ballot Marking Devices) or hand-marked paper ballots. Hand-marked paper is widely considered the gold standard by cybersecurity experts because it creates a physical record that can't be "hacked" after the fact.
  2. Attend Board of Election Meetings: These are public. Go. Ask about their "Logic and Accuracy" testing. Ask if their tabulators are ever connected to the internet—even via a "private" cellular modem.
  3. Volunteer as a Poll Observer: The best way to understand the system is to be inside it. You'll see how the machines are opened, how the totals are printed, and how the results are transported.
  4. Support Post-Election Audits: Specifically, look for "Risk-Limiting Audits" (RLAs). These use statistical samples of paper ballots to verify that the electronic totals are correct. If your state doesn't do them, ask your legislators why.

Ultimately, Spoonamore’s warnings aren't just about one man or one letter. They are a call for radical transparency in a system that governs the very foundation of the country. Whether the "KingPin" is real or a theoretical ghost, the lack of transparency in electronic tabulation is a bug, not a feature.