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"[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_. 

This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decisionmaker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on stateprize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts with statedependent (...) 

This paper examines the preferencebased approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of statedependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of statedependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under statedependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) 

De Finetti's treatise on the theory of probability begins with the provocative statement PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST, meaning that probability does not exist in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists only subjectively within the minds of individuals. De Finetti defined subjective probabilities in terms of the rates at which individuals are willing to bet money on events, even though, in principle, such betting rates could depend on statedependent marginal utility for money as well as on beliefs. Most later authors, from (...) 

This paper examines methodological issues raised by revealed preference theory in economics: particularly contemporary revealed preference theory. The paper has three goals. First, to make the case that revealed preference theory is a broad research program in choice theory—not a single theory—and understanding this diversity is essential to any methodological analysis of the program. Second, to explore some of the existing criticisms of revealed preference theory in a way that emphasizes how the effectiveness of the critique depends on the particular (...) 



This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the nonspecialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...) 

Truth and probability; Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources; The bases of probability; Subjective probability as the measure of a nonmeasurable set; The elicitation of personal probabilities; Probability: beware of falsifications; Probable knowledge. 



Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decisionmaking in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worstcase or bestcase scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decisionmaker. 



This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...) 





The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealedpreference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken. 



Statistical decision theory, whether based on Bayesian principles or other concepts such as minimax or admissibility, relies on minimizing expected loss or maximizing expected utility. Loss and utility functions are generally treated as unitless numerical measures of value for consequences. Here, we address the issue of the units in which loss and utility are settled and the implications that those units have on the rankings of potential decisions. When multiple currencies are available for paying the loss, one must take explicit (...) 









Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a stateindependent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this article we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of whatcounts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible (...) 