Military doctrine isn't just a manual stored in a dusty cabinet in Rawalpindi. It's a living, breathing identity. When we talk about fighting to the end: the pakistan army's way of war, we aren't just discussing tactical maneuvers in the Punjab plains or the rugged terrain of Kashmir. We’re talking about a deeply ingrained institutional mindset that views the survival of the state as synonymous with the survival of the army itself.
It's intense.
For decades, scholars and policy wonks have tried to peel back the layers of how Pakistan views its much larger neighbor, India. C. Christine Fair, perhaps the most prominent scholar on this specific subject, basically argues that for the Pakistan Army, "winning" isn't necessarily about capturing territory or even achieving a decisive battlefield victory. It’s about not losing. It’s about the refusal to accept Indian hegemony in South Asia, no matter the cost. This isn't just some abstract theory; it’s a strategic culture that dictates everything from nuclear posture to "bleeding" the enemy through asymmetrical means.
The Revisionist State and the "Indian Threat"
Why is the army like this? Honestly, you have to look at 1947. The trauma of Partition and the subsequent wars—1948, 1965, and the devastating loss of East Pakistan in 1971—created a permanent "insecurity complex." To the high command, India is an existential threat that never truly accepted Pakistan's existence.
This leads to a peculiar way of war. Most militaries see war as a means to a political end. For Pakistan, the struggle itself is often the point. Even when they lose—like in 1971—the institutional narrative shifts to explain away the defeat as a betrayal by politicians or a conspiracy of international powers. This allows them to maintain the stance of fighting to the end: the pakistan army's way of war without ever having to concede that their strategic goals might be unattainable.
Think about the "Strategic Depth" concept. For years, the army sought to ensure that Afghanistan remained a friendly (or at least non-hostile) backyard. They wanted a place to retreat and regroup if Indian tanks ever crossed the border in force. It sounds like something out of a Cold War thriller, but for the generals in GHQ, it was—and in many ways still is—a baseline necessity for survival.
The Nuclear Umbrella and Asymmetric Tactics
By the late 1980s, things shifted. Pakistan realized they couldn't win a conventional arms race against India. India's economy was growing, their defense budget was ballooning, and the math just didn't add up for Islamabad. So, they went nuclear.
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But they didn't just build a "deterrent." They built a shield.
Under the cover of nuclear weapons, the army felt they could engage in "low-intensity conflict." Basically, they could support insurgencies in Kashmir or elsewhere, knowing that India would be hesitant to launch a full-scale conventional invasion because of the risk of things going "mushroom cloud" shaped. It’s a high-stakes game of chicken. It’s what experts call the "stability-instability paradox." The strategic level is stable because of nukes, but the tactical level becomes incredibly unstable because one side feels safe enough to cause trouble.
The Culture of Jihad and the Soldier-Sunni Identity
You can't talk about fighting to the end: the pakistan army's way of war without mentioning religion. This isn't just about "extremism"; it’s about how the army uses Islam as a unifying force. During the Zia-ul-Haq era in the 1970s and 80s, the army's official motto was changed to include Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah (Faith, Piety, and Struggle in the path of Allah).
This changed the DNA of the officer corps.
Earlier generations of officers were often "Sandhurst types"—British-influenced, somewhat secular, and fond of a glass of Scotch in the mess. Post-Zia, the officers coming up through the ranks were more likely to be from middle-class, more conservative backgrounds. They saw their mission not just as defending a border, but as defending the "Citadel of Islam." This religious framing makes the idea of "fighting to the end" much more potent. If you're fighting a holy war, compromise feels a lot like apostasy.
The 1999 Kargil Conflict: A Case Study in Risk
Kargil was the ultimate expression of this mindset. General Pervez Musharraf and a small group of generals launched a covert operation to seize high-altitude outposts that India had vacated for the winter. It was brilliant tactically but a disaster strategically.
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They thought they could present India with a fait accompli.
They were wrong.
India fought back with massive artillery and air power. More importantly, the international community—led by the U.S.—refused to back Pakistan. Even then, the army didn't see it as a failure of their "way of war." They saw it as a political failure by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who "succumbed to pressure" and ordered a withdrawal. This reinforces the "fighting to the end" myth: the soldiers are always brave and successful; the politicians are always weak.
The Internal War: TTP and the Shift to the West
Recently, the "way of war" has had to adapt. After 9/11, the fire they helped stoke in Afghanistan started burning inside Pakistan. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) began attacking the state itself. Suddenly, the army that was designed to fight on the plains of Punjab had to learn how to fight a counter-insurgency (COIN) in the mountains of Waziristan.
It wasn't easy.
They lost thousands of soldiers. They had to bulldoze entire markets and displace millions of their own citizens during operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad. But even here, the "way of war" persisted. The army didn't look for a political settlement first; they went in with heavy kinetic force. They used gunships and tanks against their own people because that is what they know: overwhelming force until the "enemy" is suppressed.
Why the "End" Never Actually Comes
The most fascinating part about the Pakistan Army's doctrine is its durability. Despite economic crises, political turmoil, and international isolation, the core belief remains: Pakistan is a state under siege, and only the army can save it.
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This leads to a "war economy." The army isn't just a military; it’s a massive business conglomerate. They own bakeries, cement factories, and real estate developments. This economic power allows them to sustain their "way of war" even when the national treasury is empty. It makes the institution nearly immune to civilian oversight. If you control the narrative of "fighting to the end," you can justify almost any level of political intervention or economic privilege.
Navigating the Future of South Asian Conflict
If you’re trying to understand where this goes next, you have to realize that the Pakistan Army's way of war is fundamentally reactive to India's "Cold Start" doctrine. India wants to be able to launch quick, limited strikes without crossing the nuclear threshold. Pakistan responds by developing tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons.
It’s an escalatory spiral.
For anyone looking at the security landscape of South Asia, the takeaways are pretty clear, albeit a bit grim. First, don't expect the Pakistan Army to "evolve" into a traditional, civilian-controlled military anytime soon. Their identity is too tied to the idea of being the sole protectors of the nation. Second, the risk of a "miscalculation" remains incredibly high. When both sides are convinced they can "win" or at least "not lose" through sheer willpower and brinkmanship, the margin for error is razor-thin.
Actionable Insights for the Informed Observer
Understanding fighting to the end: the pakistan army's way of war requires looking past the headlines and into the institutional history of Rawalpindi. If you are monitoring regional risks or analyzing international relations, keep these points in mind:
- Watch the "Hybrid" Space: The army has increasingly moved into the "5th Generation Warfare" space, focusing on information operations and social media to maintain their narrative at home and abroad.
- Economic Constraints vs. Military Will: Historically, we assumed a failing economy would force a military to scale back. In Pakistan, the opposite often happens—the military tightens its grip to ensure its own resources are protected.
- The China Factor: As the U.S. relationship has cooled, the "all-weather friendship" with China has become the army's new strategic lifeline, providing the hardware and diplomatic cover needed to maintain their stance against India.
- Civil-Military Tension: Any attempt by a civilian leader to normalize relations with India—especially on trade—will likely be viewed by the military as a threat to the "way of war" and suppressed.
The cycle of defiance continues. It’s not about winning a war in the Western sense of signing a treaty and going home. It’s about the perpetual state of the struggle. For the Pakistan Army, the "end" isn't a destination; it's a permanent horizon they are always marching toward, rifle in hand.